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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
STATE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE MOTOR
CARRIERS
BY JOHN J. GEORGE
MAGNITUDE OF INTERSTATE OPERATION
As could be easily foreseen, motor transportation has not
recognized the accidents of state lines. It was imperative that
this transportation become interstate, especially in urban areas
near state lines, such for example as New York City, Washing-
ton, Chicago, and St. Louis. Similarly, states like Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, because of
smallness of area, were destined to become the scene of extensive
interstate operations.1
The mileage of interstate bus routes serves as one index to the
magnitude of interstate motor carriage. Of the total 263,000
of common carrier bus route mileage in the United States 48,362
or approximately one-fifth is interstate. Of this interstate
mileage Oregon has 2996; California, 2895; Massachusetts,
3000; Missouri, 3491; and New Jersey, 4488. We find, ex-
pressed in percentage of entire bus route mileage (interstate
and intrastate), that interstate bus route mileage constitutes 32
per cent in Oregon and Massachusetts; 40 in California; 62 in
New Jersey; 70 in Rhode Island; and 93 per cent in the District
of Columbia. On the other hand, states with extensive total
bus route mileage but only a small interstate per centage include
Ohio, with 13 per cent, and Pennsylvania, with only six per cent.2
Other indices are the number of interstate bus operators and
the number of vehicles employed. There are 515 such carriers
using 3012 busses. The Northeast shows the greatest propor-
tion of these;3 here are found 200 of the 515 carriers and 1339
'Motor transportation has become even international. See Re Barnes
(Wash.), P. U. R. 1923 E, 723, but more especially Bus TRANSPORTATION,
November, 1927, 658, and P. U. R. 1927 D, 526. In the last citation the
California commission held that it has no power to regulate motor carriers
operating between a point in Mexico and a point in the United States.
2 Bus FACTs, 1928, 8-9. See also FACTS AND FIGURES OF THE AUTOMOBILE
INDEYSTRY, 1927, 80.
'Northeast here includes Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wis-
consin. See Bus FACTS, 1927, 4, and 1928, 7-8.
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of the 3012 busses. Among the states in this region New Jersey
leads with 63 carriers and 476 busses. Operating in Rhode
Island are 60 motor carriers, 47 of whom are interstate.4 Intra-
state busses in Rhode Island numbered 106 in 1926, while inter-
state totalled 109.- More than half the busses operated in Colo-
rado are interstate. In contrast one finds that only a small
percentage of operators and vehicles are interstate in Pennsyl-
vania, Ohio and Washington State.
It appears that in 1926 there were engaged in interstate motor
commerce approximately 25,000 trucks.6
But the "exclusive interstate" figures tend to minimize the
magnitude of interstate carrier business, for often an inter-
state carrier engages the same vehicle in both interstate and in-
trastate carriage. As early as 1924 it appeared that only one-
fourth of the motor transportation was interstate7 Because of
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in 1925 barring
State denial of certificates to interstate carriers, the last four
years have seen rapid increase in the number and volume of busi-
ness of interstate carriers. Within one year after the Buck de-
cision fifty-four interstate lines sprang into existence between
New Jersey and New York City, and between New Jersey and
the city of Philadelphia.
EARLY EFFORTS AT REGULATION
The regulation of interstate motor transportation has under-
gone some rather discouraging vicissitudes already, and the
experience seems by no means to be at an end. Until 1925 the
states took toward interstate carriers pretty much the same
regulatory attitude as toward purely intrastate carriers; since
1925 the states have been denied authority to refuse an interstate
carrier a certificate to operate. Consequently, since there has
been instituted no Federal regulation, state efforts at regulation
represent the sum total of control over interstate carriage; unex-
pectedly enough there have been placed in the path of these
' Ibid.
' Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission, LETTER, February 25, 1926.
* T. D. Pratt (representing 21 truck associations and 14 corporations and
individuals), statement before the Interstate Commerce Committee, March
26, 1926.
'Rosenbaum and Lilienthal, in JOURNAL OF LAND AND PUBLIC UTILITY
ECONOMICS, July, 1926.
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state efforts constitutional hurdles barring at least one phase of
regulation and leaving those phases which went over the hurdles
unnerved and uncertain. Today interstate motor transporta-
tion enjoys an immunity from effective regulation not dissimilar
to that experienced by railroad transportation between the
Wabash decision 8 in 1886 and the passage of the Interstate Com-
merce Act of 1887.
Before 1925 the authority of the states to regulate interstate
motor transportation was not seriously questioned. That au-
thority rested on the doctrine in the leading case of Gibbons v.
Ogden0 (1824) reinforced by the decisions in Minnesota Rate
Cases0 (1913), Hendrick v. Maryland11 (1915), and Kane v.
New Jersey2 (1916). As it stood till 1925 that doctrine per-
mitted the states in the absence of Federal legislation to pre-
scribe for those phases of interstate commerce not demanding
general or uniform regulation "reasonable provisions for local
needs."' 1  Under this authority has been built up whatever
regulation is applicable to interstate operation today.
POWER OF STATE TO DENY CERTIFICATES
By 1925 it was a well-established administrative fact that an
interstate carrier must have a certificate of public convenience
and necessity to operate in a given state. This is attested by
the decisions in both courts and state commissions. Failure to
meet state terms resulted in denial of certificate in Pennsylvania
in 1921.15 And twice the Illinois commission denied certificates
a 118 U. S. 557.
'9 Wheat. 1.
'230 U. S. 352.
1235 U. S. 610.
242 U. S. 160. See also (1927), 11 MINN. L. REv. 157-62.
"Invaluable on the question of interstate regulation is the article by
C. M. Kneier in (1927) National Municipal Review 510-19. See also Ivan
Bowen, "Danger Ahead from Federal Regulation," in Bus TRANSPORTA-
TION, Sep., 1927, 489.
" Chambersburg G. & W. St. Ry. v. Hardman (Pa.), P. U. R. 1921 C,
628; Geneseo-Rock Island Bus Co. v. Hilbert (Ill.), P. U. R. 1923 E, 311;
East St. L. C. & W. R. Co. v. Dingerson, (Ill.), P. U. R. 1924 C, 127;
Interstate Motor Transit Co. v. Derr (Mont., 1924), 288 P. 624; Northern
Pacific Ry. v. Schoenfeldt (Wash., 1923), 213 P. 26; Schmidt v. Dept. of
P. W. (Wash., 1923), 213 P. 31; Re Engelke (N. Y.), P. U. R. 1921 C, 71;
People v. Barbuas (1923), 230 Ill. A. 560.
"First case in note 14.
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to interstate carriers during the next three years.16 But as
early as 1922 California sensed the possible conflict over inter-
state carriage and exempted from the commission order direct-
ing cessation of illegal operation of a motor line that part of the
service furnished by the carrier which extended from a point in
California to a point in Oregon.'7
In 1923 Buck, a carrier of Oregon, applied to the Washington
Department of Public Works for a certificate to extend his motor
transportation line into Washington. The Washington statute
empowers the commission to grant a competitive certificate only
when the existing motor carrier or carriers are not furnishing
adequate service and will not do so."8 Under this provision the
commission decided existing service sufficient and consequently
denied Buck's application to operate into Washington. Buck
took the matter to the United States District Court which upheld
the commission.19 From this decision Buck appealed to the Su-
preme Court, which on March 2, 1925, rendered a decision re-
versing the lower court and held that a state cannot deny a cer-
tificate to an interstate carrier on the ground that existing serv-
ice is adequate. Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the court,
said that such denial was not to preserve the highways, but to
prevent competition; that the requirement did not regulate the
manner of use of the highways, but the persons who might use
them.2 0  The same day the court passed upon the validity of a
Maryland denial2l of certificate to an interstate carrier. The
Maryland act gives the commission power to investigate the
question of granting a certificate and to deny or grant according
to its findings.2 2 The commission had investigated and denied
the certificate to an exclusively interstate carrier, who appealed.
The Supreme Court held this denial an undue interference with
interstate commerce and unconstitutional.
These two decisions destroyed the former doctrine of reason-
able state regulation of interstate commerce in the absence of
Federal regulation insofar as the power of the state to deny a
= Geneseo case and East St. Louis case, supra, note 14.1 tNevada-California-Oregon Ry. Co. v. Pinneo, P. U. R. 1925 E, 421.
"Laws of 1921, Ch. 111, as amended 1923, Sec. 4.
"(1928), 295 F. 197.
Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 308.
George W. Bush & Sons v. Maloy (1925), 267 U. S. 317.
Acts of 1916, Ch. 610, Sec. 4, as amended, Acts of 1922, Ch. 401, Sec. 3.
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certificate is concerned. Since then no state has been able to
deny an interstate carrier the privilege of operation over its
highways.23  Under the exigencies of interstate commerce a
state has no more authority to deny admittance to an interstate
carrier who comes to use state highways for private profit than
to exclude from its territory a citizen of another state who
wishes to establish residence within its limits. The state is di-
rected to say "Whosoever will use my highways in interstate
transportation, let him come."
Varying attitudes are expressed by different states today as to
whether a certificate must be secured by an interstate carrier.
One group represented by Kentucky, 24 New York,2r and Ohio2M
hold that the interstate carrier must secure the certificate. The
Colorado commission has ruled that since the Supreme Court
decisions have not denied the power of state commissions to
grant certificates to interstate carriers, such power remains.
The commission exercised this power in August, 1927.27 Like
Colorado is Montana, whose commission has declared its juris-
diction over the applications for certificates by interstate car-
riers ;28 and similarly South Dakota.29
A third group take a practical view of the question of cer-
tification of interstate carriers and declare that there is no use
in going through the motion of certification; they make no pre-
tense at requiring certification. In this group we find Massa-
chusetts, whose statute specifically exempting from the local
' The commissions have not been slow to recognize the significance of
these two decisions. See for example Cannon Ball Transportation Co. v.
Pub. Utils. Com. (Ohio, 1925), 149 N. E. 713, affirming commission order;
Re Schappi Bus Lines (Ind.), P. U. R. 1925 E, 401; Re Hart Motor Coach
Co. and Re Spooner (N. H.), P. U. R. 1927 C, 603; Re Strait (S. D.),
P. U. R. 1926 B, 503; Newport Electric Corporation v. Oakley (R. I., 1925),
129 A. 613; People v. Yahme (Cal., 1925), 235 P. 50.
' Crigger & Stepp v. Allen (Ky., 1927), 292 S. W. 1. c. 811. An inter-
state carrier without a certificate to operate in Kentucky cannot claim pro-
tection against unfair state or municipal impositions against him. North-
ern Kentucky Transportation Co. v. City of Bellevue (Ky., 1926), 285 S. W.
241.
Re Brewster-Danbury Motor Bus, P. U. R. 1925 D, 307.
Cannon Ball Transportation Co. v. Pub. Utils. Com. (Ohio, 1925), 149
N. E. 713.
"Paradox Land and Transport Co., Decision 1399.
'Re Bennett, P. U. R. 1927 C, 595.
"Re Babcock (1926), P. U. R. 1927 C, 603.
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license and state certificate requirements has been upheld 0 by
the Supreme Judicial Court. Arizona is another representative
of this third group. Recognizing that it could not deny the cer-
tificate, its commission dismissed a petition from an interstate
carrier.'* The Maine commission has ruled that the Bush and
Buck decisions make a certificate for interstate operation un-
necessary.8 2  Indiana is a fourth representative of the group
holding that no certificate is necessary for interstate operation.3 3
New Hampshire has stressed its inability to handle the inter-
state question as affected by the Buck and Bush decisions, the
commission declaring January 4, 1926, that it has no jurisdiction
over interstate motor carriers.3 4  This commission ruled sim-
ilarly on August 10, 1926, and dismissed a petition for certificate
to operate a vehicle in interstate commerce.3 5 While the com-
missions may vary in their attitude toward the necessity of se-
curing the certificate, the essential point to be observed is that
no state has authority to deny a certificate for interstate motor
transportation. But the United States Supreme Court on May
31, 1927, ruled that a state may require the interstate carrier to
take out a certificate.36
SCOPE OF INTERSTATE OPERATION
When is a motor carrier operation interstate in character?
The New York Supreme Court sees as valid interstate opera-
tion the movement of a bus line beginning in New York City,
going into New Jersey and thence back into Ulster County,
New York.37 Where a motor carrier operates twenty-two
'Barrows v. Farnum's Stage Lines (1926), 150 N. E. 206. Similarly,
the decision in Commonwealth v. Potter, 150 N. E. 213. This act has been
held valid also by the U. S. District Court in Holyoke St. Ry. Co. v.
Interstate Busses Corp. (1926), 11 F. (2d) 161. See also Boston & Maine
R. v. Cate (1926), 150 N. E. 210.
Re Arizona Storage and Distributing Co., P. U. R. 1926 D, 467.
U Re Maine Motor Coaches, P. U. R. 1926 B, 561.
Statement of Chairman Singleton, June 7, 1927.
Re Hart Motor Coach Co., P. U. R. 1927 C, 603.
Re Spooner, Ibid.
U Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554. On inability to deny certificates see
further Re Strait (S. D.), P. U. R. 1926 B, 503; cases decided by New
Hampshire and Maryland commissions, P. U. R. 1927 C, 603-4; Cannon
Ball Transportation Co. v. Pub. Utils. Cam. (Ohio, 1925), 149 N. E. 713.
"Garrison v. Paramount Bus Corp. (1928), 223 App. Div. 75, 227 N. Y.
S. 510.
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miles in Rhode Island and runs three and one-third miles in-
to another state for the primary if not sole purpose of avoiding
changing busses between points within the state of Rhode Island,
the operation was held not to be interstate in the sense of the
interstate commerce clause of the Constitution.3 A carrier
authorized to do only interstate business acts illegally when he
takes a passenger from one point in a state to another in the
same state, but just near state line, and sells him a ticket over
an authorized line which takes the passenger across a river to a
point a few hundred feet into another state. Such operation is
not validly interstate. 31
Hauling a few interstate passengers at one end of his route
does not transform the holder of an intrastate certificate into
an interstate carrier, the Pennsylvania commission has ruled.40
Taking St. Louis passengers destined to Kansas City, Missouri,
first to East St. Louis, Illinois, and thence back to Kansas City,
Missouri, or taking Kansas City passengers destined to St. Louis
first to Kansas City, Kansas, and thence back to St. Louis is only
a subterfuge and is illegal.41 Subterfuges similar to those in the
above case, practiced by the Detroit-Cincinnati Coach Line, led
the Ohio commission to cancel the certificate to do interstate
business.42
STATE'S POWER OVER INTRASTATE OPERATION BY INTERSTATE
CARRIER
The Buck and Bush decisions failed to show the effect of the
state certificate requirement on the intrastate phase of business
of an interstate carrier.43 Several cases involving this question
have subsequently arisen.
The order of the Maryland commission denying to an inter-
state carrier a certificate to engage in intrastate carriage has
been upheld.4 Likewise in New Hampshire a certificate is
"Re Intercity Coach Co. (R. I.), P. U. R. 1927 E., 421-5.
Scioto Valley R. & P. Co. v. Interstate Motor Transit Co., P. U. R. 1927
D, 720.
P. S. Com. v. Highway Motor Coach Co., P. U. R. 1927 D, 309.
Re Detroit-Chicago Motor Bus Co., P. U. R. 1928 C, 103, 105.
' Re Detroit-Cincinnati Coach Line, P. U. R. 1928 C, 571-75.
43 (1927), 11 MINN. L. Rnv. 157-62.
" Washington Motor Coach Co. v. West, P. U. R. 1927 C, 603. Also
(1926), N. A. R. & U. C., Bulletin 71.
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necessary for an interstate carrier to engage in intrastate busi-
ness."5 Nor, it has been ruled, is it a burden on interstate com-
merce to deny authorization to an agency engaged in interstate
operation to carry intrastate passengers. 6 In considering ap-
plications for intrastate operation by interstate carriers, the
commissions of Maryland, Washington, and Colorado will be
guided by factors of public convenience and necessity as if the
applicant were not already engaged in interstate operation.4 7
The Massachusetts act requiring local license and state certifi-
cates for intrastate operation is valid even when applied to inter-
state carriers desiring to engage in intrastate operation.48
When an interstate operator makes application for an intra-
state certificate it is irrelevant that the community concerned
has asked that interstate service be established,"4 the Indiana
commission has said. An order of the Colorado commission for
a court injunction against an interstate carrier's proposal to en-
gage in intrastate business does not affect his continuing to do
interstate business. Had the commission order sought to apply
to the interstate part of the enterprise, such effort would have
amounted to an interference with interstate commerce. But in
the case at hand the Colorado Supreme Court made it clear that
the state may prohibit an interstate carrier from doing intra-
state business without thereby violating the commerce clause of
the Constitution. 5 0 The South Dakota commission has withheld
from an interstate carrier a certificate to engage in intrastate
commerce.51 Similarly the Missouri commission has said that
an interstate operator cannot demand the privilege of engaging
in intrastate activity and that authority to do so will not be
granted where existing motor carriers and railways are furnish-
" Haselton v. Interstate Stages, (N. H. 1926), 133 A. 1. c. 457.
'See Cannon Ball case, supra, note 36.
1 Re Application of Red Star Line, case 2515, Nov. 29, 1926; Re Town-
send, (Colo.) P. U. R. 1928 A, 180; Columbia Gorge Motor Coach System
(Wash.), P. U. R. 1928 A, 119.
1 Barrows v. Farnum's Stage Line (Mass., 1926), 150 N. E. 206, and
similarly the same court in Commonwealth v. Potter (Mass., 1926), 150
N. E. 218.
Re Gold Seal Transit Co., P. U. R. 1927 D, 166.
"Western Transportation Co. v. People, 261 P. 1.
" Re Seemon, P. U. R. 1927 E, 534.
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ing adequate service and would suffer decreased traffic by the
establishment of more intrastate competition. 2
The question of an interstate carrier's enter into intrastate
carriage reached an early high point in Interstate Busses Cor-
poration v. Holyoke Street Railway, decided by the United States
Supreme Court on January 3, 1927. The appellant had resisted
the Massachusetts law requiring certificates for intrastate opera-
tion. On having its drivers arrested at the instigation of de-
fendant's employees for operating intrastate without the cer-
tificate, the appellant sought from the United States District
Court an injunction against the enforcement of the Massachu-
setts act. The injunction was denied, whereupon the bus com-
pany appealed to the Supreme Court. The reasoning of the
highest tribunal was substantially this: (1) If the act "directly
interferes with or burdens appellant's interstate commerce," it
cannot be upheld; (2) the act, existing in some form before in-
terstate operation developed aims to apply to motor bus opera-
tion intrastate and local; (3) the statute does not demand the
certificates of only interstate carriers, but of all seeking to en-
gage in intrastate business; (4) it is necessary for appellant to
show that the state requirement prejudices his interstate com-
merce, which he has failed to do; (5) appellant has failed to
show that it could not economically carry its intrastate passen-
gers in separate busses. The Court concludes that the act is
not arbitrary or unreasonable; that due process of law has not
been denied; and that an interstate carrier cannot evade state
regulation of intrastate carriage by connecting its intrastate
transportation to its interstate or by unnecessarily comingling
the two types of business. In affirming the decree of the dis-
trict court denying an injunction the Supreme Court rebukes
the appellant for not having tried to comply with the provisions
of the statute.53
Thus it follows unmistakably that to engage in intrastate
operation, an interstate carrier must meet the terms of the state,
'Re Pickwick Stages System, P. U. R. 1928 B, 1.
' Interstate Busses Corporation v. Holyoke Street Railway (1927), 273
U. S. 45. See also (1927), N. A. R. & U. C., Bulletin. The decision of the
District Court is reported in 11 F. (2d) 161. See also decision of Pennsyl-
vania commission relative to state control of intrastate operation by inter-
state carrier in Re E. H. Scott, P. U. R. 1925 D, 529.
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so long as those terms impose no burden on interstate com-
merce. 5'
In so holding, the Court was merely emphasizing a point which
had already been stressed by several state agencies. The In-
diana commission had earlier granted an intrastate certificate
to an interstate carrier on the condition that the latter not
charge less than the pre-existing carrier operating on the same
intrastate route was charging.55  In Interstate Motor Transit
Co. v. Deer, the Montana supreme court had held that all regula-
tions by the state which are reasonable, arise from the police
power, and which are not violative of any act of Congress, can
be applied to interstate carriage. 51 Similar was the declaration
made by the Arizona commission the same year.57
POWER OF STATE TO REGULATE
While deprived of its authority to deny certificates for inter-
state operation over its highways, the state yet enjoys power
to establish proper regulations for the preservation of those
highways, and to prescribe regulations for safety in the use
thereof, so long as those regulations do not put on interstate
commerce any unreasonable burden.58 Our concern now is to
inquire into the applicability of these state regulations which
have been established and questioned as applicable to interstate
operation.
The general authority to so regulate has been expressed, sub-
sequent to the great decisions, by several leading states. The
California act was so amended in 1925 as to exempt therefrom
interstate and foreign commerce,59 but specifically reserved to
the commission its power to prescribe such uniform, reason-
able and non-discriminatory regulations as the commission
deems warranted for public health, safety, convenience, and wel-
fare.60 The supreme court of Ohio has had occasion to stress the
" On state regulation of interstate commerce (by motor vehicles) so long
as not burdensome, see such earlier cases as Packard v. Banton (1923),
264 U. S. 140; Kane v. New Jersey (1916), 242 U. S. 160; Hendrick v.
Maryland (1914), 235 U. S. 610.
Re Indianapolis-Cincinnati Bus Co., P. U. R. 1926 D, 362.
(1924), 228 P. 624.
"Re Arizona Pacific Transit Co., P. U. R. 1925 C, 501.
Justice Brandeis speaking for the Court in the Buck case, 267 U. S. 308.
"Supra, Note 1.
Stat. 1925, Ch. 254, p. 433.
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validity of reasonable state regulation of interstate transporta-
tion by motor carriers.6 1 Likewise has the South Dakota com-
mission.62 If the interstate transportation fails to meet the
valid regulations set up by the state, it clearly appears that such
transportation can be excluded from the highways of the state.0 3
In the state of Washington the commission has cancelled a cer-
tificate for interstate operation because of failure to meet the
terms of the certificate, and this was done subsequent to the
Buck decision.64 The most important case of cancellation of an
interstate certificate to date is that of the Detroit-Cincinnati
Coach Line, decided by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,
March 26, 1928. The company was charged with seeking to
avoid intrastate regulation by selling interstate tickets from
Cincinnati to Monroe, Michigan, a small town just across the
Ohio line, with the understanding that passengers could get out
at Toledo. It was further charged that to passengers stating
they wished passage from Toledo to Cincinnati the company
answered that they must get a ticket to Covington, Kentucky.
These charges were substantiated by witnesses. The Commis-
sion viewed this part of the conduct complained of as actually
operating an intrastate business under an interstate certificate.
The Commission also found that the company had violated
state laws and rules by driving busses "at an excessive and dan-
gerous rate of speed." Hearings were held at different points
along the route and the company failed to refute the charges
made against it. Supporting its view by five United States
Supreme Court decisions in point, by one of its own previous de-
cisions, and by one of the Ohio Supreme Court, the Commission
declared the certificate revoked, and ordered the line to cease
operation within fifteen daysA'
'Scioto Valley Ry. Co. v. Interstate Motor Transit Co. (Ohio, 1927),
cited in P. U. R. 1927 D, 720; also in Cannon Ball case, supra.
Re Strait, P. U. R. 1926 B, 503.
' Charles B. Elder (1926), 21 Ill. L. Rev. 166-70, citing Red Ball Transit
Co. v. Marshall, 8 F. (2d) 635, and the Duke case, 266 U. S. 570.
Re C. W. Lefors, P. U. R. 1926 D, 615.
'Re Detroit-Cincinnati Coach Line, P. U. R. 1928 C, 571-75. Nor can a
carrier convert intrastate commerce into interstate commerce by exacting
of passengers between points in the same state the fare applicable to passage
to or from a more distant point in another state. Sprout v. South Bend
(1928), 72 L. Ed. 529.
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In this decision revoking an interstate certificate on the double
grounds of subterfuge to evade intrastate regulation and per-
sistent violation of the state speed laws, the Ohio commission
lays down several points of significance. First, it was held that
state law and regulations can be applied to interstate motor
operation so long they are reasonable. This is no new doctrine
in motor carrier regulation, for it had been announced in the
Buck decision. Secondly, it was held that no carrier authorized
to do interstate business shall evade intrastate regulation by a
mere subterfuge. Thirdly, the Commission ruled that state
police regulations must be observed by motor busses, interstate
as well as intrastate. And finally it was decided that the au-
thority granting a certificate has power to revoke it if the
reasonable terms of the certificate are not met.
POWER OF STATE TO REQUIRE INSURANCE
Before 1925 there appeared a tendency to apply the insurance
requirement to interstate motor transportation as well as to
intrastate. Such an exaction was upheld in Illinois-6 and Mon-
tana.6 But in the Liberty Highway case in 1923 the United
States District Court ruled that indemnity insurance constituted
an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce and was there-
fore invalid.68 Shortly after this the Ohio act requiring prop-
erty insurance of interstate truck transportation was declared
invalid by the same grade of tribunal." The supreme tribunal
has held invalid a state requirement of indemnity insurance on
goods handled in interstate commerce under private contract.7 0
All the above cases arising since 1925 involved the state re-
quirement of insurance as applied to carriers of property. The
insurance requirement as applicable to carriers of passengers in
interstate commerce bade fair to be passed upon in Clark v. Pub-
lic Utilities Commission,71 decided by the United States Supreme
Court on May 31, 1927. The validity of Ohio requirements, in-
People v. Barbuas (1923), 230 Ill. A. 560.
Interstate Transit Co. v. Derr, (Mont., 1924) 228 P. 624. In a note,
National Municipal Review, 515, C. M. Kneier erroneously refers to this
case as a California case.294 F. 703.
* Red Ball Transit Co. v. Marshall, 8 F. (2d) 635.
Michigan Public Utilities Com. v. Duke (1924), 266 U. S. 570.
274 U. S. 554.
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cluding the insurance feature, was assailed by an interstate
passenger carrier in the United States District Court, in which
court the counsel of the Ohio commission answered that the
State would not insist on the insurance provision. On appeal
the Supreme Court said that the insurance feature was there-
fore not before it for consideration. In this manner a valuable
opportunity to get a ruling from the highest eourt on the validity
of insurance as applied to carriers of interstate passengers was
frustrated. The "waiving" of the feature by the Ohio commis-
sion indicated clearly the view that previous rulings as applied
to insurance on property carried in interstate commerce would
be applied to passenger carriers were the state to insist on the
point.
But in 1928 there appear four instances of state application
of the passenger insurance requirement to interstate carriers.
The Missouri commission has held that statutory requirements
and administrative regulations relative to insurance must be
met by interstate carriers as well as by intrastate. 1 Holding
that the statute requiring insurance of "motor vehicle common
carriers" included interstate as well as intrastate carriers, the
Indiana commission conditioned a certificate to an interstate
applicant upon applicant's complying with motor carrier in-
surance requirements. 73 On April 2, 1928, the Nebraska com-
mission reasoned that passengers on interstate busses are en-
titled to the same degree of safety and protection as are those
on an intrastate vehicle, concluded the state was under constitu-
tional obligation to protect the two types of passenger equally,
and ordered interstate carriers to comply with the insurance re-
quirement.74 Communications from the Indiana and Nebraska
commissions in late October, 1928, state that the interstate car-
riers are meeting the requirement and are seeking no appeals
from the commission decisions requiring insurance of them.
Thus these state commissions are doing what the Ohio commis-
sion a year ago was afraid to insist on doing.
In 1928 an exclusively interstate carrier was validly required
Re Pickwick Stages System, P. U. R. 1928 B, 1.
Re Shore Line Motor Coach Co., P. U. R. 1928 C, 175.
"Re Insurance Requirement for Motor Transportation Companies, P. U.
R. 1928 D, 396-7. Letter from Indiana Public Service Commission, October
26, 1928, and one from Nebraska State Railway Commission, October 30,
1928, state that interstate carriers are complying.
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by the state to furnish liability insurance against injuring per-
sons other than the passengers carried.7 5 Interstate carriers
are becoming convinced that good business demands their fur-
nishing passenger liability protection.
ROUTING, SERVICE, AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Under the Buck and Duke decisions state regulations pri-
marily to promote highway safety are a valid exercise of the
police power; consequently it appears that licensing of drivers
may be required.76 But it has been held that a city cannot re-
quire the licensing of interstate drivers.77 Routes of interstate
carriers are specified in Kentucky, and the practice has been
held valid in Rhode Island .7 Not only routes, but also time
schedules and speed are regulated in Kentucky. Where public
safety so demands, speed may be regulated under the state police
power.79 The Michigan commission has been advised that
under the Supreme Court ruling in Clark v. Poor safety regula-
tions applicable to intrastate carriers can be applied to inter-
state.s0
An unreasonable requirement appears in the Schappi Bus
Lines case, decided by the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit on March 12, 1928. An ordinance
of the City of Hammond, Indiana, forbade the operation of
motor vehicles on certain streets, and prohibited their stopping
within several miles of the business center to load or unload
passengers. General parking on both sides of the street was al-
lowed, and a local motor bus was allowed by contract with the
city to do that which the ordinance in question prohibited. The
district court had refused the interstate carrier an injunction
against the enforcement of the ordinance, whereupon the car-
rier appealed. The Circuit Court of Appeals declared the
ordinance "unreasonable, discriminatory, and invalid as a police
"Sprout v. South Bend (1928), 48 S. Ct. 502, 72 L. Ed. (Adv.) 529.
Further evidence that such requirements are valid can be seen in Smith
v. Alabama (1888), 124 U. S. 465; Hendrick v. Maryland (1915), 235 U. S.
610; and Kane v. New Jersey (1916). 242 U. S. 160.
"International Motor Transit Co. v. City of Seattle, (Wash., 19261, 251
P. 120.
Newport Electric Corporation v. Oakley (1925), 129 A. 613.
"Southern Ry. Co. v. King, (1910), 217 U. S. 524.
Bus TRANSPORTATION, Oct., 1927, 597.
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regulation," and ordered the District Court to grant the in-
junctive relief sought.8 '
STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE CARRIERS
From the beginning the Federal Courts have displayed a
liberal attitude toward state exactions of fees from those operat-
ing motor vehicles in interstate commerce. A tax on horse-
power of vehicles in interstate travel was justified by the Su-
preme Court on the basis of compensation for service rendered
to the motorist and for the wear he put upon the highway.8 2
In 1922 the United States District Court upheld a Washington
statute demanding a minimum license fee of ten dollars per ve-
hicle plus fifty cents per seat for a vehicle of greater than eight
capacity. The fee was required of all common carrier vehicles
operated within the state.88 A fee of one dollar per hundred
weight, required of all motor vehicles, was valid as applied to
interstate carrier vehicles, ruled the district court in a Michi-
gan case in 1923.84 The state could tax interstate carriers not
only for cost of regulation, but for anticipated repairs to the
highway, it was declared in an Ohio case.85  But in the Michigan
case the court gave warning that the state could not demand a
license to engage an interstate commerce as such.81
A state may exact a reasonable graduated license tax from ve-
hicles engaged in interstate commerce for the use of its high-
ways; such is not an unreasonable burden on interstate com-
merce, said the Supreme Court in the Duke case.8 7 A state tax
on interstate carriers exacting no more than is reasonably re-
quired is valid.88
Reasoning that the state may properly classify motor car-
riers into interstate and intrastate and tax each differently, the
(1926), 11 F. (2d) 940. A similar case decided similarly the same
day by this court is Farina Bus Line and Transportation Co. v. City of
Hammond, ibid., 943.
'Kane v. New Jersey (1916), 242 U. S. 160.
Interstate Motor Transit Co. v. Kuykendall (1922), 284 F. 882.
Liberty Highway Co. v. Michigan Pub. Utils. (1923), 294 F. 703.
Red Ball Transit Co. v. Marshall (1925), 8 F. (2d) 635. But a gross
receipts tax as instituted by Idaho could not be applied constitutionally to
interstate carriers. Bus TRANSPORTATION, Feb., 1927, 52.
Supra, note 84.
"266 U. S. 570.
Supra, note 75.
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United States District Court has upheld an act of Connecticut
imposing a tax of one cent per mile run by interstate busses over
Connecticut highways. The state possesses the authority to
exercise reasonable discretion in taxation as here exemplified,
and the courts will not revise the state system of taxation in
order to secure a different distribution of the tax burden. The
court also pointed out that the fact of the United States having
aided in construction of a highway does not deprive the state
of authority to impose an excise tax on interstate carriers using
that highway. On February 20, 1928, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the decision of the District Court. 9
A recent act of New Jersey similar to that of Connecticut de-
mands one and one-half cents per mile tax. Failure to pay this
resulted in barring from the highways some 200 interstate car-
riers by August 25, 1927. Up to September 2, 116 had complied;
but 102 carriers secured injunctions against the enforcement of
the act.96
An ordinance of Philadelphia exacting an annual license fee
of all busses using its streets imposes no unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce, when applied to interstate carriers.91
Perhaps the most important tax case is that of Clark v. Poor,9 2
decided by the Supreme Court on May 31, 1927. Clark was
operating exclusively in interstate commerce between Aurora,
Indiana, and Cincinnati. Under the Ohio act he was required
to secure a certificate and therupon pay a tax based on the seat-
ing capacity of the vehicles used. Clark operated for a time in
violation of the act and then asked the district court for an in-
junction against the enforcement of the law. That tribunal
denied the injunction and Clark appealed. The gist of the Su-
preme Court's reasoning in affirming the decree of the lower
court is as follows: (1) Those who use the highways, which are
public property, are subject to state regulation requiring a con-
tribution to their upkeep and cost, although these users may be
" Interstate Busses v. Blodgett (1927), 18 F. (2d) 256, afflrmed, 48 S. Ct.
230, 72 L. Ed. (Adv.) 243.
Bus TRANSPORTATION, Oct., 1927, 597.
"American Transit Co. etc. v. City of Philadelphia (1927), 18 F. (2d)
991. See Bus AGE, Sep., 1927, 40.
" Supra, note 36. Following this decision the Indiana Commission was
reported as preparing to apply to interstate carriers its seat tax. Bus
TRANSPORTATION, Oct., 1927, 597.
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engaged exclusively in interstate commerce; (2) the tax is not
discriminatory since it is levied on interstate and intrastate car-
riers alike; (3) the tax is not an obstruction to interstate com-
merce; (4) the fact that some of the tax is used to pay the ex-
penses of the commission enforcing the law and some for pur-
poses other than commission expenses and cost and maintenance
of highways, is of no real concern to appellee. The Court con-
cluded that the tax was "for a proper purpose and not objection-
able in amount. '93
The significance of the Clark case lies first in the recognition
of the public interest in the highways and the enormous cost of
construction and maintenance. Justices Brandeis, Holmes, and
McReynolds just a year earlier had dissented in the Frost case,
contending that public property in highways outweighs private
property of a contract carrier operating over those highways.
The Clark decision says in effect to common carriers in inter-
state commerce, "You cannot escape a fair share of the burden
of financing the highway over which you carry on your busi-
ness." Secondly, the tax, in contrast to the denial of a certifi-
cate, as was adjudged in the Buck case, does not obstruct inter-
state commerce. Here is clear, definite, and unmistakable per-
mission for the states to exact a fair amount from even inter-
state carriers for the outlays for highways. Thirdly, the states
are under no minute requirements lo devote every penny of this
revenue from interstate carriers to the specific purpose of high-
way cost, or maintenance, or even to commission expenses.
Lastly, the momentous conversion of the six members from a
narrow view of private property rights as against public prop-
erty rights, to a liberal and progressive conception of the
primacy of public property rights-this conversion taking place
in less than a year-cannot be surpassed in American constitu-
tional history. Mr. Justice Brandeis speaks for a unanimous
court!
Although Indiana and Ohio have had a serious truck "war," the Clark
decision was welcomed by the INDIANAPOLIS NEws as a constructive, farsee-
ing, and farreaching decision. See editorial, OHIO STATE JOURNAL, June
25, 1927. A favorable editorial in the ATLANTA JOURNAL was eagerly
seized upon by the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and incorporated
into its leaflet, TIMELY RAIIRoAD Topics, No. 187, July 4, 1927.
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STATE AND FEDERAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS WHERE FEDERAL
AID TO HIGHWAYS IS INVOLVED
Whether a certificate to engage in motor transportation be a
regulation to conserve the use of the highway or a regulation of
the business carried on over the highway is a question which
has received some critical attention, and deservedly so, since the
Supreme Court decision in one case held that the denial of a
certificate for intrastate operation is a regulation of the use of
the highway and in another the denial of a certificate for inter-
state operation is not a regulation of the highway but a prohibi-
tion of competition."' That a highway, in the absence of any
special claim of the Federal Government, is state property is in-
disputable.96 Constructed at enormous cost to the state,96 the
highways are public property.97
Where Federal aid has been made to highway construction
the right and responsibility of the state in regard to the high-
way problem assumes a more complicated character. The
relative rights and obligations of the state and the Federal
Government are to be found in the Congressional acts relative
to highways, in the rules and regulations issued thereunder, and
in the interpretation put upon these acts by the courts. The
state legislature having indicated its acceptance of the terms of
the Federal legislation, the interrelations of the two spheres of
government are substantially as follows: (1) the Secretary of
Agriculture and the state highway commission are to agree on
what roads are to be constructed and the type and method of
construction; (2) work in each state is to be done according to
the laws of the state, under supervision of the state highway
commission and subject to inspection and approval of the Secre-
tary of Agriculture; (3) the state is to maintain the highway,
"B. C. Gavit (1927), Interstate Motor Transportation, 22 Ill. L. Rev.,
569-67. It should be observed that in Frost v. R. R. Com. (1925), 271 U. S.
588, the majority opinion held that the aim of the California requirement
of a certificate of public convenience and necessity was not preservation of
highways but regulation of the business of those transporting thereover.
"Gavit, op. cit. citing Sims v. City of Frankfort (1881), 79 Ind. 446.
Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McReynolds, Bush v. Maloy, supra.
Clark v. Poor, supra. It appears that the states have invested $834,-
867,058 in the highways. See OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, July 15, 1927,
11. The Bureau of Public Roads indicates that the Federal Government
has spent some $500,000,000 on highways.
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and failure to do so necessitates maintenance by the Federal
Government, the Secretary of Agriculture charging to state
allotment the amount paid out for such maintenance and refus-
ing all the projects for further construction in that state till the
latter recoups the Federal Treasury for the amount spent be-
cause of the state's defaulting."'
The extent to which the state power applies to the conserva-
tion and use of highways over which interstate carriers operate
was early given a general delimitation by Justice Brandeis in the
Buck case:
"With increase in the number and size of vehicles used
upon a highway, both the danger and wear and tear grow.
To exclude unnecessary vehicles-particularly the large
ones commonly used by carriers for hire-promises both
safety and economy. State regulation of that character is
valid, even as applied to interstate commerce, in the absence
of legislation by Congress which deals specifically with the
subject."99
The substance of the portion italicized above was stressed by
the Court in Morris v. Duby, two years later. Regulations of
the type permitted by the Buck decision looking to conservation
of highways have been upheld in Rhode Island,100 and the im-
perativeness of state conservation of highways has been more
recently emphasized by the Supreme Court in the Clark case, °10
and restated in Sprout ,v. South Bend.0 2
State regulation of the use of the highway can be legally insti-
tuted and applied so long as it neither "interferes with" nor "di-
rectly burdens" interstate commerce, said the court in the Hol-
yoke case,10,3 relying on the doctrine in the Hendrick and Kane
decisions,1'0 and on that in Packard v. Banton.05
Turning now to specific applications of this general authority
of the states to regulate the use of the highways, we must recall
'Morris v. Duby (1926), 274 U. S. 135. The court refers to the Federal
Highway Act of July 11, 1926, 39 Stat. 35, as amended Feb. 28, 1919, 40
Stat. 1189, 1200, and to the act of Nov. 9, 1921, 42 Stat. 212.
Italics are the writer's.
Newport Electric Corporation v. Oakley, supra.
Supra, note 96.18Supra, note 75.
Interstate Busses Corporation v. Holyoke St. Ry., supra.
(1914), 235 U. S. 610; (1916), 242 U. S. 160.
105 (1923), 264 U. 9. 140.
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that the insurance requirement as applied to property carriers
in interstate commerce has been repeatedly declared beyond the
power of the states,106 but that the insurance against injury to
persons other than passengers carried in the interstate bus has
been judicially upheld as applied to interstate passenger car-
riers. o0
In the Morris v. Duby,108 as in the Buck case, a Federal aid
highway was involved. Morris, a member of the Auto Freight
Association of Washington and Oregon, was hauling over a
twenty-two mile section of the Columbia River Highway in the
latter state. The state highway commission had by order re-
duced the maximum weight limit permitted on the highways
from 22,000 pounds (which was the limit when Morris began
operation and which had continued for four years) to 16,500
pounds. Morris, complaining that he could not compete with
rail carriers under the new maximum load limit and that such
order was an interference with interstate commerce, sought an
injunctiofi in the District Court, which pointed out the rights
and obligations of the state and Federal Governments over
Federal highways as mentioned above.1 9 The Supreme Court
reasoned that neither the state consent to operate over the high-
way nor anything in state or Federal statutes supported appel-
lant's claim to a contract to operate his vehicle forever under
the weight limit existing at the time he began operation; that
the preservation of the highways is of more importance than a
motor carrier's offering competition to a rail line. Further,
that since there was no averment or definite information that
the commission order reducing the load limit had been secured
by fraud or abuse of power, the court would accept the commis-
sion order as proper. The tribunal concluded that the order
was neither unreasonable. discriminatory, nor arbitrary, and af-
firmed the decree of the District Court denying an injunction
against the enforcement of the order.
Summarizing now as to state regulation of interstate motor
transportation, we observe first that the state cannot deny a
ILiberty Highway Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission (1923),
294 F. 703; Red Ball case, supra.
Supra, note 75.11 Supra, note 98.
Substance referred to in note 98.
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certificate for interstate operation; and that much divergence
of opinion prevails among the states as to whether the formality
of securing such certificate must be observed. Secondly, that
the state cannot demand liability insurance of carriers trans-
porting only property in interstate commerce; but that in-
surance requirement as to carriers of passengers in interstate
commerce protecting nonpassengers has been held valid.
Thirdly, that taxation imposed by the state on interstate car-
riers to recoup for facilities offered carrier by the state is valid.
This may include registration of vehicles used,1o as well as seat
tax or tax on horsepower or bus-miles operated. State power
to make these exactions is not impaired by the fact that the
United States has aided in the construction of the highway in-
volved.21l
Fourthly, that weight restrictions may be imposed in order
to safeguard and conserve the highways; and fifthly, that a gen-
eral power to regulate may be exercised by the state so long as
such is reasonable and not an undue burden on interstate com-
merce, there being no Federal legislation on the matter.
But in spite of the state authority to regulate interstate motor
carriers, the consensus of opinion seems overwhelming that the
states cannot regulate them effectively and that Federal regula-
tion of this ihterstate transportation is necessary and inevitable.
oIvan Bowen, "Danger Ahead from Federal Regulation," in Bus TRANS-
PORTATION, September 1927, 490, citing Hendrick v. Maryland (1915), 235
U. S. 610.
'Blodgett case, 18 F (2d) 256.
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